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Abstract
This paper examines three Inter-American Court (IACtHR)
cases on behalf of the Enxet-Sur and Sanapana claims for
communal territory in Paraguay. I argue that while the adju-
dication of the cases was successful, the aftereffects of adju-
dication have produced new legal geographies that threaten
to undermine the advances made by adjudication. Struc-
tured in five parts, the paper begins with an overview of the
opportunities and challenges to Indigenous rights in Para-
guay followed by a detailed discussion of the adjudication of
the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa, and Xákmok Kásek cases.
Next, I draw from extensive ethnographic research investi-
gating these cases in Paraguay to consider how implemen-
tation actually takes place and with what effects on the
three claimant communities. The paper encourages a discus-
sion between geographers and legal scholars, suggesting
that adjudication only leads to greater social justice if it is
coupled with effective and meaningful implementation.
1 Introduction
Developments in international law have created impor-
tant legal protections for Indigenous peoples’ rights to
land and territory since the 1980s.1 Discord between
international and domestic law2 and the actions of state
governments to implement the law,3 however, compro-
mise the de facto territorial rights of many Indigenous
peoples across the Americas.4 The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (hereafter IACtHR) has been a
* Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Center for Latin American Stud-
ies at the University of Arizona.
1. J. Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law:
From Victims to Actors (2016).
2. Problems implementing the International Labor Organization Conven-
tion 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples after ratification illustrate
this. See, e.g. A. Yupsanis, ‘ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indig-
enous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 1989-2009: An
Overview’, 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 433 (2010). See also
R. Provost and C. Sheppard, Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Plu-
ralism (2013).
3. J. Schneider, ‘Should Supervision be Unlinked from the General Assem-
bly of the Organization of American States?’, 5(1/2) Inter-American
and European Human Rights Journal (2012).
4. R. Sieder, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and the Law in Latin America’, in
C. Lennox and D. Short (eds.), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
414 (2016).
primary vehicle to advance jurisprudence in support of
Indigenous land rights.5 Nevertheless, examining the
adjudication of cases before the IACtHR and implemen-
tation of its judgments underscores the challenges of
ensuring de facto Indigenous rights. Implementing the
IACtHR and Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (hereafter IACHR) recommendations have pro-
ven challenging across jurisdictions and cases.6
This article discusses the adjudication of three IACtHR
cases in Paraguay and offers a brief reflection on the
aftereffects of adjudication from the perspective of legal
geography. The cases at the heart of this article concern
Enxet-Sur and Sanapana Indigenous peoples and their
land claims in Paraguay’s Chaco region: Yakye Axa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2005, Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2006, and Xákmok
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2010.
The Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek
communities were each dispossessed of their respective
territories by the expansion of the cattle ranching indus-
try between 1890 and 1950. Each community petitioned
the Paraguayan state for land within its ancestral territo-
ries pursuant to legal instruments adopted by the Para-
guayan state in the 1980s–1990s. Despite legal entitle-
ment to communal property guaranteed in Paraguayan
law, state officials failed to adjudicate the three claims in
a timely or adequate manner, subsequently violating
human rights in each community.7 With legal counsel
from the nongovernmental organisation Tierraviva a Los
Pueblos Indígenas del Chaco (hereafter Tierraviva), each
community eventually petitioned the Inter-American
5. A. Fuentes, ‘Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Traditional Lands and
Exploitation of Natural Resources: The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights’ Safeguards’, 24 International Journal on Minority and Group
Rights (2017).
6. F.G. Isa, ‘The Decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the Awas Tingni vs. Nicaragua Case (2001): The Implementation Gap’,
8 The Age of Human Rights Journal (2017); A. Meijknecht, B. Rom-
bouts & J. Asarfi, ‘The implementation of IACtHR judgments concerning
land rights in Suriname: Saramaka People V. Suriname and Subsequent
Cases’, available at: <https:// pure. uvt. nl/ portal/ en/ publications/ the -
implementation -of -iacthr -judgments -concerning -land -rights -in -
suriname - -saramaka -people -v -suriname -and -subsequent -
cases(cfb1d14d -de42 -4bbb -a7d5 -4a6e9a1d095f). html> (last visited 15
January 2018).
7. The judgments can be read in their entirety by a simple search on Inter-
American Court website ‘jurisprudence finder’, available at: <www.
corteidh. or. cr/ cf/ Jurisprudencia2/ index. cfm ?lang= en> (last visited 30
September 2017).
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System for arbitration. The IACtHR issued three sepa-
rate judgments on the cases in 2005, 2006 and 2010,
which found Paraguay guilty of numerous human rights
violations.8 I discuss the cases in greater detail in the fol-
lowing pages.
The adjudication of each community’s case was success-
ful—the IACtHR ruled in favour of the claimant com-
munities. Nevertheless, the aftereffects of adjudication
have been mixed. The IACtHR judgments themselves
serve as an important form of restitution for each com-
munity by validating their claims at the international
level,9 mandating material and symbolic reparations for
the victims,10 and functioning as political tools claimant
community members and their allies use as leverage in
efforts to force the state to comply with the IACtHR.
But while adjudication may be successful in the court-
room, the aftereffects of adjudication can exacerbate
Indigenous dispossession and marginalisation11 if judg-
ments are not carefully implemented in a timely man-
ner. To illustrate this point, I first draw from the
IACtHR judgments themselves to sketch the adjudica-
tion process, then follow that with a brief discussion of
some aftereffects of adjudication by highlighting exam-
ples from the implementation process to date.
If implementation problems were unique to one
IACtHR ruling, perhaps that could be explained as an
anomaly. Yet the problems persist across all the Para-
guayan cases and extant scholarship suggests that imple-
mentation is almost always resisted by state govern-
ments.12 A recent Open Society Justice Initiative study13
supports this point and illustrates that land restitution
has also been challenging in cases across Kenya and
Malaysia.
Implementation delays and problems in Paraguay
undermine the jurisprudential advances wrought by the
successful adjudication of the cases. Thus, I use a legal
geography approach14 to consider how adjudication and
implementation of Indigenous land claims illustrates
iterative relationships between space and law with pro-
found implications on the possibilities of justice for
8. Ibid.
9. This comment is based on 45 qualitative interviews conducted by
author with claimant community members between May 2015 and July
2016.
10. For a full accounting of the reparations refer to the Merits, Reparations,
and Costs of each case, above at n. 7.
11. J. Correia, ‘Life in the Gap: Indigeneity, Dispossession, and Land Rights
in the Paraguayan Chaco’ (Ph.D. thesis on file at the University of Colo-
rado Boulder).
12. United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
Indigenous Peoples, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Human rights and
Indigenous issues’ (2006), at 209 (emphasis added); C.R. Garavito and
C. Kauffman, ‘De las órdenes a la práctica: análisis y estrategias para el
cumplimiento de las decisiones del Sistema interamericano de derechos
humanos’, in M. Rojas (ed.), Desafíos del sistema interamericano de
derechos humanos: Nuevos tiempos, viejos retos 276 (2015); OSJI
(Open Society Justice Initiative), Strategic Litigation Impacts on Indige-
nous Land Rights (2017).
13. Ibid., at 2.
14. For an excellent overview, see L. Bennett and A. Layard, ‘Legal Geogra-
phy: Becoming Spatial Detectives’, 406 Geography Compass, at
407-12. I discuss legal geography in more detail at 15.
claimant communities.15 I therefore contribute a synthe-
sis and analysis of the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa, and
Xákmok Kásek cases in Paraguay to advocate for post-
adjudication practices that support Indigenous com-
munities struggling for land rights amidst human rights
violations.
Explicitly focusing on courtroom deliberations and
resultant jurisprudence can occlude the intended and
unintended de facto aftereffects of adjudication for
plaintiffs. Moreover, a strict binary view of implementa-
tion (i.e. if it happened or not) negates a consideration of
how adjudication impacts victims’ lives after judgments
have been issued. Perhaps an anecdote is necessary to
illustrate my point. At a recent meeting with prominent
human rights lawyers, I was questioned about the
implementation of the cases discussed in this article. I
replied that the Paraguayan state purchased land for the
Yakye Axa community in 2012 but that the community
cannot access that land because no public access road
exists. The person who questioned me replied, and I
paraphrase, ‘implementation had occurred, which is
good’. However, the point is not ‘that implementation
occurred’ but that implementation can exacerbate mar-
ginalisation, undermine a community’s rights and create
new forms of trauma if not done carefully through
meaningful consultation with Indigenous victims of
human rights abuse. Hence, this article asks: how did
the adjudication of the three Paraguayan IACtHR cases
and their aftereffects shape the rights of Enxet-Sur and
Sanapana claimant communities? Moreover, what might
these dynamics say about adjudicating for Indigenous
land rights via the IACtHR beyond Paraguay?
The IACtHR plays an important role in international
efforts to pressure states to grant collective territorial
rights to Indigenous communities.16 The impact of the
IACtHR on Indigenous rights is little studied outside of
critical legal studies. Studies by Wainwright and Bry-
an,17 Bryan,18 Hale,19 Medina,20 Correia21 are notable
exceptions. On the other hand, legal scholars have con-
tributed numerous analyses of the advances and limita-
tions of Indigenous rights jurisprudence produced by
15. Correia (2017), above n. 11.
16. See, e.g. A. Stocks, ‚Too Much for Too Few: Problems of Indigenous
Land Rights in Latin America’, 34 Annual Review of Anthropology 85
(2005); J.M. Pasqualucci, ‘International Indigenous Land Rights: A Cri-
tique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples’, 27(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal 51 (2009); Gilbert
(2016), above n. 1, at 1; OSJI, above n. 12, at 2.
17. J. Wainwright and J. Bryan, ‘Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolo-
nial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and
Belize’, 16 Cultural Geographies 153 (2009).
18. J. Bryan, ‘Map or Be Mapped: Land, Race, and Rights in Eastern Nicara-
gua’ (PhD thesis on file at the University of California Berkeley).
19. C. Hale, ‘Resistencia para que? Territory, Autonomy and Neoliberal
Entanglements in the “Empty Spaces” of Central America’, 40(2) Econ-
omy and Society 184 (2011).
20. L.K. Medina, ‘The Production of Indigenous Land Rights: Judicial Deci-
sions Across National, Regional, and Global Scales’, 39 PoLAR: Political
and Legal Anthropology Review 139 (2016).
21. Correia, above n. 11, at 2.
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the IACtHR22 and technical accounting of the imple-
mentation process.23 These two approaches to investi-
gating how the IACtHR shapes social justice for Indige-
nous peoples are rarely in conversation in existing litera-
ture.24
This article encourages a closer conversation between
critical social scientists and legal scholars who are inves-
tigating and evaluating the IACtHR and its role in sup-
porting Indigenous rights. For that purpose, I turn to
legal geography, which is an interdisciplinary approach
dedicated to investigating the mutual constitution of law
and space with keen attention to how that relationship
shapes the limits and possibilities for social justice.25
Legal geography is a unique intellectual space that
brings legal scholars and geographers together to think
through new ways of understanding how law shapes
space and society while considering what the implica-
tions of space and society are on the law.26
1.1 Methods and Case Study Selection
Since 2013, I have been working with Enxet-Sur and
Sanapana peoples from Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa, and
Xákmok Kásek to understand their struggles better and
share critical analyses of the cases. Therefore, this arti-
cle is informed by 16 months of total field research in
Paraguay that includes extensive participant observation
based on months living in each community and accom-
panying many aspects of their legal and political strug-
gles. Tierraviva has also been fundamental in facilitating
this research and informing my understanding of the
cases and their work with each claimant community. My
archival research and over 150 semi-structured and con-
versational interviews with affected claimant community
members, state officials, cattle ranchers and Tierraviva
also inform my analysis.27 However, this article is not an
ethnography of the cases. Instead, I draw from a textual
analysis of the IACtHR judgments themselves to pro-
vide a unique synthesis of the cases and complement
that with insights from interviews and participant obser-
vation.
22. S.J Anaya and C. Grossman, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A
New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, 19(1) Arizo-
na Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (2002); see also,
J.M. Pasqualucci, above n. 16, at 3; J. Gilbert, ‘Land Rights as Human
Rights: The Case for a Specific Right to Land’, 10(18) Sur 115 (2013);
C. Grossman, ‘Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the
Inter-American System’, 8(3) Human Rights Brief 2 (2002).
23. T.M. Antkowiak, ‘Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples
and the Inter-American Court’, 35(1) University of Pennsylvania Jour-
nal of International Law 113 (2013); T.M. Antkowiak, ‘A Dark Side of
Virtue: The Inter-American Court and Reparations for Indigenous Peo-
ples’, 25(1) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 1
(2014); Garavito and Kauffman (2015), above n. 12, at 2.
24. Wainwright and Bryan (2009), above n. 17, at 3; Hale (2011), above n.
19, at 3; Medina (2016), above n. 20, at 3; and Gilbert (2016), above
n. 1, at 1; Correia (2017), above n. 11 at 2 are notable exceptions.
25. I. Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney & A. Kedar, The Expanding
Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (2014).
26. A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulous, ‘Law’s Spatial Turn: Geography, Jus-
tice, and a Certain Fear of Space’, 7(2) Law, Culture and the Humani-
ties 187 (2011).
27. I also conducted research as a part of an Open Society Justice Initiative
investigation a which also informs this paper; see, OSJI (2017), above n.
12, at 2.
Following efforts to decolonise human geography schol-
arship and address the uneven power relations that
much academic research entails,28 I do not claim univer-
sal knowledge about the Enxet-Sur or Sanapana strug-
gles, daily life or legal cases. Instead, I recognise that my
position as a non-Indigenous male working from a uni-
versity in the United States places me in a particular
privileged position from which I share a partial, but
informed, perspective of these cases.29 This article
should not be read as an exhaustive account of the
IACtHR cases in Paraguay, but as part of a broader con-
versation about the politics of the IACtHR and adjudi-
cation of Indigenous land rights.30
I selected the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok
Kásek cases because they advance Indigenous rights
jurisprudence,31 yet to my knowledge no other scholars
have conducted extensive field-based research on the
lived experience of the aftereffects of adjudication in
these Paraguayan cases before the IACtHR. The three
cases comprise more than one-quarter of the total cases
the IACtHR has adjudicated concerning Indigenous
land rights to date. Together, the cases collectively illus-
trate the immense challenges to implementing IACtHR
judgments in favour of Indigenous communities across
the Americas, yet also show how IACtHR judgments
can create important political tools to support Indige-
nous struggles for land rights.
1.2 Article Organisation
The article is organised into five parts. First, I provide
general context to outline some major opportunities and
challenges for Indigenous rights in Paraguay. Next, I
sketch the proceedings of the three cases to synthesise
and chart the domestic remedies, process before the
Inter-American System, and pertinent American Con-
vention articles. The following section draws from legal
geography and considers how different conceptions of
land, territory and property shape the Enxet-Sur and
Sanapana cases. The fourth section briefly examines
28. P. Noxolo, ‘Introduction: Decolonising Geographical Knowledge in a
Colonized and Re-Colonising Postcolonial World’, 49(3) Area 317
(2017).
29. D. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’, 14(3) Feminist Studies 575
(1988).
30. Pasqualucci (2009), above n. 16, at 3; Antkowiak (2013), above n. 23,
at 3, Antkowiak (2014), above n. 23, at 3; T.M. Antkowiak, ‘Social,
Economic, and Cultural Rights: The Inter-American Court at a Cross-
roads’, in Y. Haeck, O. Ruiz-Chiriboga & C. Burbano-Herrera (eds.), The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present
and Future 259 (2015); S. Vannuccini, ‘Member States’ Compliance
with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Judgments and Orders
Requiring Non-Pecuniary Reparations’, 7 Inter-American and European
Human Rights Journal 255; Garavito and Kauffman (2015), above n.
12, at 2.
31. M. Melo, ‘Recent Advances in the Justiciability of Indigenous Rights in
the Inter-American System of Human Rights’, 3(4) Sur Revista Interna-
cional de Direitos Humanos (2006); F. MacKay, ‘Indigenous Peoples’
Rights and the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights Sys-
tem’, in T. Sikor and J. Stahl (eds.), Forests and People: Property, Gov-
ernance, and Human Rights 33 (2011); A. Fodella, ‘Indigenous Peoples,
the Environment, and International Jurisprudence’, in N. Boschiero, T.
Scovazzi, C. Pitea & C. Ragni (eds.), International Courts and the
Development of International Law 349 (2013).
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some aftereffects of adjudication. The article concludes
with discussion of the implications of the tensions
between adjudication and implementation for Indige-
nous social justice.
2 New Opportunities for Land
Rights: Paraguay’s
‘Multicultural Turn’
During the 1980s through mid-1990s, multicultural
reforms swept Latin American countries that had his-
torically oppressed the Indigenous peoples who live in
those countries.32 Paraguay joined the ‘multicultural
turn’ with the adoption of Law 904/81 in 1981. Domes-
tic Indigenous rights law, however, was quite limited
until Dictator Alfredo Stroessner was deposed from
power in 1989. The political rupture that came in the
wake of Stroessner’s 34-year rule created an opportunity
to usher in democratic reforms and take a concerted step
towards creating a multicultural state by extending new
rights to Indigenous peoples.33
Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek utilised
newfound multicultural rights to advance their land
claims cases, which evolved with the adoption of differ-
ent legal mechanisms between 1981 and 1993. The legal
basis for the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok
Kásek cases, therefore, rests on three principal elements
of Paraguayan law that comprise the cornerstone of its
Indigenous rights framework: Law 904/81, Article 64 of
the National Constitution, and Law 234/93.
Known as the ‘Indigenous Communities Statute’, Para-
guay adopted Law 904/81 in 1981. The Law was the
first to outline a host of rights for Indigenous communi-
ties in Paraguay, of which communal property rights
and the process to request land from the state are central
to the discussion in this article. Rather than rehearse the
intricacies of the law,34 I only cover aspects of the law
necessary to understanding the Yakye Axa, Sawhoya-
maxa and Xákmok Kásek cases and how they were
advanced to the Inter-American System. First, 904/81
created the National Institute for the Indigenous
(INDI), which adjudicates issues of Indigenous affairs
in Paraguay. Designating community leaders, issuing
legal personhood and facilitating Indigenous land claims
that correlate with privately held property (as opposed
32. R. Seider, Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diver-
sity, and Democracy (2002); R. Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism:
Human Rights and the Politics of Identity (2003); S.J. Anaya, Indige-
nous Peoples in International Law, 2nd edition (2004); Gilbert (2016),
above n. 1, at 1.
33. R.H. Horst, The Stroessner Regime and Indigenous Resistance in Para-
guay (2010).
34. For analyses of Law 904/81 see CODEHUPY, Situacticón de los dere-
chos a la tierra y al territorio de los pueblos indígenas en el Paraguay
(2013); M. Blaser, Storytelling Globalization from the Chaco and
Beyond (2010); Horst (2010), above n. 33, at 5.
to public land)35 are the INDI responsibilities that most
closely pertain to the three cases in question.
The Paraguayan state adopted two other legal reforms
that significantly advanced the available legal mecha-
nisms to support Indigenous rights in the early 1990s.
Following the fall of Dictator Stroessner, Paraguay
adopted a new National Constitution in 1992. While
Chapter 5 is dedicated to Indigenous rights, Article 64
codifies Indigenous land rights:
Indigenous peoples have right to communal owner-
ship of land in extension and quality sufficient for the
preservation and development of their particular
forms of life. The state will provide them gratuitously
with these lands… The removal or transfer from
their habitat [sic] without their express consent is
prohibited.
Despite the legal advances the 1992 Constitution made
to protect Indigenous rights, the Constitution does little
to clarify or change the process by which Indigenous
communities can claim land, relying instead on Law
904/81. Paraguayan legal experts suggest there is a dis-
cord between the rights outlined in the Constitution and
the ability of Law 904/81 to serve as a procedural vehi-
cle to ensure those rights.36 In addition to the 1992 Con-
stitution, Paraguay adopted Law 234/93 in 1993 to rati-
fy the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Con-
vention 169 as domestic law, which further strengthens
de jure Indigenous land rights. The efforts to create and
adopt Indigenous rights law and policy led analysts to
report in the early 2000s that Paraguay has a ‘superior
[Indigenous rights] legal framework’.37
2.1 Challenges to Indigenous Land Rights in
Paraguay
Despite the legal advances to ensure the de jure rights of
Indigenous peoples in Paraguay, there are significant
historical and structural factors that limit de facto Indig-
enous rights38 and shape the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa
and Xákmok Kásek cases. The Paraguayan Chaco was
colonised by non-Indigenous peoples in the late nine-
teenth to mid-twentieth century.39 The Paraguayan
35. Per Law 904/81 IBR (Institute of Rural Welfare) normally adjudicates
land claims (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) that concern proper-
ties owned by the state, whereas INDI adjudicates land claims between
Indigenous peoples and private landowners.
36. CODEHUPY (2013), above n. 34, at 6.
37. R.O. Roldán, ‘Models for Recognising Indigenous Land Rights in Latin
America: The World Bank Environmental Department, Biodiversity Ser-
ies’ (2004), at 2, available at: <http:// documents. worldbank. org/
curated/ en/ 608941468743178264/ Models -for -recognizing -Indigenous
-land -rights -in -Latin -America> (last visited 7 November 2016).
38. See also CODEHUPY (2013), above n. 34, at 6; V. Tauli-Corpuz,
‘Report: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Paraguay’ (2015), avail-
able at: <http:// unsr. vtaulicorpuz. org/ site/ index. php/ documents/
country -reports/ 84 -report -paraguay> (last visited 9 October 2017).
39. A.P. Leake, ‘Subsistence and Land-Use Amongst Resettled Indigenous
People in the Paraguayan Chaco: A Participatory Approach’ (PhD thesis
on file at the University of Hertfordshire); S. Kidd, ‘Paraguay: The
Working Conditions of the Enxet Indigenous People of the Chaco’, in
International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (ed.), Enslaved Peo-
ples in the 1990s: Indigenous Peoples, Debt Bondage and Human
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state facilitated the early colonisation period by selling
approximately 90% of its territory in the Chaco to
finance debts incurred through the War of the Triple
Alliance (1864–1870).40 Subsequently, foreign investors
purchased much of the Paraguayan Chaco and gradually
established logging and cattle ranching estates.41
Powell42 showed that by the 1970s, nearly the entire
region had been converted to private ownership—name-
ly cattle ranches—that enclosed Indigenous communi-
ties and used those communities for cheap labour or
indentured servitude.43 The Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa
and Xákmok Kásek communities were all subject to the
radical restructuring of land rights and enclosed by the
boundaries of cattle ranches established in the area.44
The concentration of land tenure in the hands of cattle
ranchers has proven a central challenge to securing con-
temporary land rights for Indigenous peoples.
Problems of land distribution in Paraguay are extensive.
Paraguay is one of the most unequal countries in Latin
America, with a Gini coefficient of 0.92 for land distri-
bution.45 Over 70% of land suitable for agriculture is
dedicated to soya bean production, whereas cattle graze
on nearly 18 million hectares of land.46 As the world’s
fourth largest exporter of soya and eighth exporter of
beef,47 the Paraguayan agriculture industry has fuelled
some of the fastest rates of economic growth in Latin
America since 2010.48 Indeed soya and beef products
comprise nearly 50% of the total value of Paraguayan
exports.49 The disproportionate political economic pow-
er of agro-export industry, however, intensifies the chal-
lenges that Indigenous peoples and landless rural com-
munities have to access land via Law 904/81 or the
Agrarian Statute, respectively.50
Rights, 153-181. Anti-slavery International and International Working
Group on Indigenous Affairs (1997); R. Villagra-Carrón, The Two Sha-
mans and the Owner of the Cattle: Alterity, Storytelling and Shaman-
ism Amongst the Angaité of the Paraguayan Chaco (2010).
40. J. Renshaw, The Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco: Identity and econo-
my (2002).
41. Ibid.
42. D.R. Powell, ‘…y entonces llegó un inglés…’: Historia de la iglesia
Anglicana en el Chaco paraguayo (volume conmemorativo de los cien
años del templo de Makxawáya) (2007).
43. Kidd (1997), above n. 39, at 7.
44. Correia (2017), above n. 11, at 2.
45. A Gini score of 1 connotes ‘perfect inequality’. L.A. Galeano, ‘Paraguay
and the Expansion of Brazilian and Argentinian Agribusiness Frontiers’,
33(4) Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne
d’études du développement 458 (2012).
46. A. Guereña and L.R. Villagra, Yvy Jára: Los dueños de la tierra en Para-
guay (2016), available at: <www. quepasaenparaguay. info/ wp -content/
uploads/ YVY -JARA_ Informe_ OxfamenParaguay. pdf> (last visited 10
January 2018).
47. J. Correia, ‘Soy States: Resource Politics, Violent Environments and Soy-
bean Territorialization in Paraguay’ Journal of Peasant Studies (2017).
48. CEPALSTAT, Base de datos. Comisión Económica para América Latina y
el Caribe (2014), available at: <http:// interwp. cepal. org/ sisgen/
ConsultaIntegrada. asp ?IdAplicacion= 6& idTema= 241& idIndicador=
1650& idioma= e> (last visited 2 January 2014).
49. Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Paraguay’, available at: <https://
atlas. media. mit. edu/ en/ profile/ country/ pry/ > (last visited 20 January
2018).
50. M. Glauser, Extranjerización del territorio Paraguayo (2009); Correia
(2017), above n. 47, at 7.
The question of land rights is not merely one of finan-
cial ability to access legal recourse. Broader bureaucratic
issues and the rule of law are also important factors.51
The country ranks in the 19th percentile for the rule of
law, rated by Transparency International as 1.8 out of 7
regarding the independence of the judiciary, which pla-
ces Paraguay at the 138th position among the 142 coun-
tries surveyed.52 Corruption is also a persistent chal-
lenge that exacerbates the function of law.53 The adjudi-
cation and implementation of each case contends with
challenges created by this broader context.
3 Adjudicating the Cases: A




In this section, I draw from archival research and analy-
sis to chart the exhaustion of the domestic remedies,
proceedings before the Inter-American System, and rel-
evant articles of the American Convention (hereafter
Convention) as they pertain to the three cases in ques-
tion. The details show that what should have been a
straightforward bureaucratic and legal process resulted
in years of struggles for each community. The duration
of each case was a primary concern for the IACHR and
facilitated their admission to the IACtHR. While many
of the factual aspects of these cases are unfortunately
shared with other Indigenous communities in Para-
guay54—e.g. socio-economic marginalisation, wide-
spread discrimination and state neglect—Yakye Axa,
Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek all share the same
legal counsel, of which some members had attended
trainings at the IACHR and were well acquainted with
the Inter-American System and the potential remedies
it could offer. The desire of the three communities to
petition the IACHR and IACtHR in search of a remedy
—coupled with the skill of their legal counsel and its
financial support—allowed the Enxet-Sur and Sanapana
to advance their cases to the international arena.55
3.1 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
2005
The Yakye Axa community began its land claim in
1993, and it remains unresolved at the time of writing
this article. In August of that year, the community’s
leaders registered with INDI and later wrote IBR to
51. K. Hetherington, Guerilla Auditors: the Politics of Transparency in Neo-
liberal Paraguay (2011).
52. Transparency International. ‘Corruption by Country/Territory: Para-
guay’, available at: <www. transparency. org/ country/ #PRY> (last visited
12 September 2016).
53. Ibid.
54. Tauli-Corpuz (2015), above n. 38, at 6.
55. OSJI (2017), above n. 12, at 2; Correia (2017), above n. 11, at 2.
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claim their right to land within their ancestral territory
pursuant to Article 64 of the 1992 Constitution. The
lands claimed are part of the Yakye Axa ancestral terri-
tory and currently comprise the Loma Verde and Maro-
ma cattle ranches, which community members had
laboured on since the establishment of the ranches at the
turn of the twentieth century. Yakye Axa community
members attempted to reoccupy part of their ancestral
territory in 1996 because IBR and INDI had failed to
adjudicate the case. However, the Loma Verde land-
owners prevented the community from reoccupying the
land. As a result, the Yakye Axa community occupies
the margin of a highway in front of the ranch and the
disputed lands. Due to a lack of adequate water, hunt-
ing, agricultural land, employment opportunities and
state services, living conditions on the margin of the
highway are extremely difficult.
INDI finally recognised the Yakye Axa community
leaders in September 1996—a process that should take
no more than 30 days pursuant to Law 904/81 but took
more than 3 years. In March 1997, the newly recognised
leaders filed a writ of amparo to argue that they should
be allowed to access the lands they claim for subsistence
purposes and stated that local landowners harass and
abuse community members. However, the Civil and
Commercial Trial Court dismissed the amparo suit on
the grounds that statute of limitations had expired. In
May 1997, INDI requested the Catholic University
Centre for Anthropological Studies (CEADUC) investi-
gate the community’s claim and clarify what lands his-
torically pertain to the community, which CEADUC
determined encompasses 18,188 hectares. By October
1997, the Yakye Axa legal counsel requested that the
Trial Court issue a precautionary measure to protect the
claimed lands, which was granted in November but con-
tested by the landowners who also rejected the CEA-
DUC study and community’s offer to purchase the
land.
The Loma Verde and Maroma landowners filed a crimi-
nal complaint against Yakye Axa, in April 1998, arguing
that the community has been trespassing. Community
leaders sought legal personhood for the community in
May 1998. Moreover, in June 1998 the community lead-
ers asserted that the landowners were logging the prop-
erty and requested the Supreme Court of Justice to
mandate that the landowners halt all actions on the land.
In support of the Yakye Axa claim, IBR determined that
the disputed lands are part of Yakye Axa’s ‘territorial
habitat’ and that the community’s claim was warranted.
Nevertheless, the landowners and community continued
to struggle over the land with each filing minor claims
against the other during 1999. The Supreme Court ulti-
mately interceded and dismissed the second amparo
claim against the landowners in July 1999. INDI never-
theless recommended that the land sale proceed and
declared that Yakye Axa in a ‘state of emergency’ due to
the gravity of the living conditions on the margin of the
highway in August 1999. Between August and Decem-
ber of that year, the community made numerous
requests to negotiate the sale of Loma Verde land,
which the landowner denied. Despite earlier requests,
INDI still had not recognised the community’s legal
personhood, and Yakye Axa leaders again requested
such status in addition to the adjudication of their land
claim in November 1999.
In January 2000, the community’s legal counsel and the
Centre for Justice and International Law, filed a petition
with the IACHR that alleged Paraguay had violated
Article 25 (Right to Juridical Protection) of the Conven-
tion. Meanwhile, the community continued to exhaust
available domestic remedies. A Trial Court decision in
August 2000 prohibited community members from
entering the Loma Verde lands to gather drinking water
or hunt for food and exacerbated the living conditions in
Yakye Axa. After that decision, Yakye Axa requested
that Congress intervene because neither INDI nor IBR
had been able to resolve the land claim. Sympathetic
members of Congress agreed to sponsor the expropria-
tion and resubmitted requests that INDI recognise the
community’s legal status in October 2000. Nevertheless,
the Chamber of Deputies Committee on Human Rights
and Indigenous Affairs, as well as the Committee on
Rural Welfare in November, rejected the proposed
expropriation in late 2000 on the grounds that it violated
the private property rights of the landowner at the time.
INDI finally approved Yakye Axa’s legal status in May
2001. In August of the same year, a trial judge ordered
that Yakye Axa be evicted from the margin of the high-
way, which an appellate court approved. For unknown
reasons, state officials did not evict the community from
the margin of the highway. In fact, the community still
occupies the margin of the highway at the time of writ-
ing this article.
Between October 2001 and May 2002, INDI annexed
7,901 hectares of Loma Verde for Yakye Axa and the
President of the Republic recognised the community’s
legal status. Moreover, the original amparo suit was
reinstated to protect the land from further development
and the president drafted a bill to reserve the disputed
lands by the community. The Senate Committee on
Agrarian Reform and Rural Welfare rejected the presi-
dent’s bill in June 2002 because they argued that the
Loma Verde landowners rationally exploit the property
and therefore it cannot be expropriated. By August of
that year, a Trial Court lifted all precautionary measures
that had restricted Loma Verde use of the disputed
lands.
The case was adopted by the IACHR in October 2002.56
The IACHR recommended that Paraguay take specific
actions to secure the lands claimed for the community,
protect those lands until they are secured, guarantee a
judicial remedy for land claims, make reparations to
community members and prevent the recurrence of
similar violations in the future. However, by March
2003 the IACHR submitted the Yakye Axa case to the
IACtHR because Paraguay failed to act on any of the
IACHR recommendations. In its filing, the IACHR
56. Organization of American States, Report N. 2/02 Admissibility Petition
12.313, 27 February 2002.
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argued that Paraguay was culpable for the following vio-
lations of the Convention: Article 4—Right to life; Arti-
cle 8—Right to a fair trial; Article 21—Right to proper-
ty; Article 25—Right to juridical protection. Each of the
alleged violations was made vis-à-vis Article 1—Obliga-
tion to respect rights.
The IACtHR issued its decision on the Yakye Axa case
in June 2005, finding Paraguay responsible for numer-
ous violations of the Convention. Paraguay violated
Article 4(1) because the state’s handling of the commu-
nity’s land claim directly interfered with their ability to
live a decent life and denied community members access
to reasonable living conditions. Paraguayan state offi-
cials were cognisant that the community suffered a long-
standing inability to access basic life needs such as
water, food and employment, yet did little to protect
livelihoods by ensuring the minimum standards of liv-
ing. Paraguay violated Article 8 because relevant state
institutions failed to represent the community during
domestic and criminal proceedings adequately. The
inability of state officials to resolve the case promptly
denied the community its Right to a Fair Trial. Para-
guay violated Article 21 because state officials did not
recognise the cultural and spiritual value of Yakye Axa’s
ancestral territory.
The IACtHR argued that Paraguay had not appreciated
the gravity of the land claim and ultimately maintained
the community’s displacement to the margin of the
highway, which ensured their undue suffering. Finally,
Paraguay violated Article 25 because state institutions
failed to ensure the availability of adequate legal rem-
edies or the timely resolution of the community’s
requests—not just for land but also legal personhood.
That the land claim spanned 11 years without resolution
was unreasonable, particularly because the land claim is
not technically challenging or complex. The IACtHR
argued that the land claim began when the community
filed its initial request for legal status in 1993, as
opposed to the state’s suggestion that the claim did not
begin until 2001. The IACtHR did not find that Para-
guay had violated Article 4(1); however, due to a lack of
evidence to establish culpability and cause of death.
3.2 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay 2006
The Sawhoyamaxa community began its land claim in
1991 and it remains unresolved at the time of writing
this article. Unlike the Yakye Axa community, which
was a largely unified group of people living together on
the Loma Verde ranch before displacement, the Enxet-
Sur people of Sawhoyamaxa were spread across numer-
ous cattle ranches in the region. Citing Law 904/81, the
Sawhoyamaxa community requested that INDI formal-
ly recognise its legal status and leaders in August 1991.
At that time, the community also requested that INDI
secure the return of 8,000 hectares of the community’s
ancestral land. The legal basis for the claim was the fact
that Paraguay had sold Sawhoyamaxa land to private
companies in the late 1800s without consulting or offer-
ing to compensate the community. Not long after start-
ing their land claim, the people of Sawhoyamaxa were
displaced from the Loma Porã and Maroma cattle
ranches where they had long lived and laboured. After
displacement from the ranches, the community estab-
lished itself on the margin of the highway in front of the
ranch and the claimed lands.
Between initiation of the land claim in 1991 through the
end of 1993, INDI and IBR carried out administrative
actions to investigate the community’s claim and the
viability of returning the disputed land to the communi-
ty. The landowner at the time, Compañía Paraguaya de
Novillos S.A. (COMPENSA), refuted the land claim by
asserting legal domicile and arguing that that land was
rationally exploited and restitution would be against the
company’s financial interest. INDI nonetheless admit-
ted the Sawhoyamaxa petition for land restitution.
Upon receiving official recognition as a legal entity in
September 1993, the community expanded its land
claim to 15,000 hectares in accordance with Article 64 of
the 1992 Constitution. At that time, Sawhoyamaxa also
requested that the state file an injunction against COM-
PENSA to halt all land use because the company was
actively logging.
The Court of First Instance in Civil and Business Law
issued a preliminary injunction and lis pendens against
COMPENSA in February 1994 to halt all deforestation.
IBR recommended that COMPENSA sell the disputed
lands, and in April 1994 the National Congress Cham-
ber of Deputies finds that the company had violated the
injunction by continuing large-scale logging practices.
Despite Law 904/81 prohibiting the sale of land to third
parties while such land is under consideration for resti-
tution to Indigenous communities, COMPENSA sold
the land in question to Roswell and Kansol in 1995 and
requested that IBR expunge the company the land
claim.
Sawhoyamaxa maintained its claims to the disputed
lands and requested that IBR continue negotiating for
the sale of the land from Roswell and Kansol. Due to
IBR delays, Sawhoyamaxa requested the case file be for-
warded to INDI for adjudication pursuant to Law
904/81 after which the community’s legal counsel
requested the land be condemned and National Con-
gress intervene in February 1997. In May 1997, INDI
affirmed the request with resolution 138/97; later that
month leaders from Sawhoyamaxa introduced a bill to
the Chamber of Deputies requesting the land be trans-
ferred to the community because it has been con-
demned. One year later, the Chamber of Deputies Com-
mittee on Human Rights and Indigenous Affairs rejec-
ted the proposed condemnation bill, citing that the land
was rationally exploited.
INDI granted legal status to the Sawhoyamaxa com-
munity in late July 1998, 7 years after the community
filed its petition for such recognition. Meanwhile, Ros-
well and Kansol. challenged the injunctions against the
company, requesting the state lift them in October 1998.
In December 1998, IBR issued report 2065, arguing that
the lands held by Roswell and Kansol are ‘rationally
exploited’ and therefore the state could not expropriate
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the land. In June 1999, IBR stated it did not have the
authority to adjudicate Indigenous land claims, that all
such actions proceed under the supervision of INDI and
transferred all Sawhoyamaxa case files to INDI.
Sawhoyamaxa pursued the expropriation with support
from Senators in June 1999. The argument for expro-
priation was bolstered by the near-simultaneous release
of the Presidential Executive Order 3789, which
declared Sawhoyamaxa in ‘a state of emergency’ because
the community had been prevented from accessing its
‘traditional means of subsistence tied to [its] cultural
identity’. State officials attributed the lack of land access
to malnutrition and serious health problems in the com-
munity. The Senate rejected the community’s second
expropriation attempt in November 2000 arguing that
the land could not be expropriated because it was
rationally exploited.
In May 2001, following the second failed expropriation
attempt, the community’s legal counsel filed the initial
petition to the IACHR, which was admitted in February
2003.57 Tierraviva also requested that INDI take legal
measures to protect the disputed land in June 2003.
INDI later requested that the Court of First Instance in
Civil and Business Law, issue a lis pendens and prelimi-
nary injunction against Roswell and Kansol to halt all
deforestation, in late July 2003.
The IACHR issued its Report on Merits 73/04 in Octo-
ber 2004. The Report recommends that Paraguay take
actionable measures to protect the Sawhoyamaxa prop-
erty rights by demarcating the community’s territorial
limits and titling land according to the community’s
claim, pursuant to Paraguayan Law 904/81 and Article
64 of the National Constitution. Furthermore, the
IACHR recommended that Paraguay ensure the land be
protected from further degradation until the title is
secured for the community. In addition to land restitu-
tion, the IACHR recommended that Paraguay publicly
acknowledge its culpability in human rights violations
against Sawhoyamaxa and make both communal and
individual reparations.
The Paraguayan state failed to adopt any of the IACHR
recommendations. IACHR submitted the case to the
IACtHR in February 2005, alleging the following viola-
tions of the Convention: Article 4(1)—Prohibition of
arbitrary deprivation of life; Article 5—Right to humane
treatment; Article 8—Right to fair trial; Article 21—
Right to property; Article 25—Right to juridical protec-
tion. Each of the alleged violations was made vis-à-vis
Article 1(1)—Obligation of non-discrimination; Article
2—Obligation to give domestic legal effects to rights.
In its judgment on the Sawhoyamaxa case, the IACtHR
found that Paraguay had violated Articles 8 and 25 vis-
à-vis Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Conventions. The
amount of time INDI took to recognise the Sawhoya-
maxa legal personality far exceeded the statues outlined
in Law 904/81. The procedure should take no more
than 30 days, yet in this case took nearly 5 years, violat-
57. Organization of American States, Report N. 12/03 Admissibility Petition
322/01, 20 February 2003.
ing community’s right to a fair trial. Moreover, at the
time of the IACtHR judgment, the Sawhoyamaxa land
claim had spanned 13 years with no meaningful action,
which the IACtHR determined unreasonable in relation
to Article 8 of the Convention.
It is important to note that the IACtHR argued that
Paraguayan law had not considered the cultural and spi-
ritual significance of the land for the community.
Instead, the state’s argumentation only considered the
economic value of the land and negated Indigenous land
rights as protected in Article 64 of the National Consti-
tution and Paraguayan Law 234/93 that ratified the
ILO Convention 169. The legal limits of INDI’s
authority to establish penalties against parties that vio-
late Indigenous rights suggested that the proceedings to
arbitrate the land were inadequate to resolve the case
and ultimately contributed to the unnecessarily long
bureaucratic process the community had endured. Since
the state did not ensure a timely or effective means to
adjudicate the claim, the IACtHR found that Paraguay
violated Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.
Paraguay violated the Right to Property (Article 21)
because the state did not adhere to its laws concerning
Indigenous rights to property, particularly the fact that
Law 904/81 states that Indigenous communities need
not have possession of their ancestral territory to claim
land within that territory. Rejecting the notion of land’s
value is merely in relation to ‘rational exploitation’ or its
economic/utilitarian value, the IACtHR maintained
that Indigenous people have inalienable rights to their
ancestral lands so long as the community can demon-
strate a meaningful spiritual or material relation with the
claimed lands. Therefore, the community had rights to
claim the land and the state an obligation to resolve that
claim; because Paraguay did not take adequate measures
to do so, it violated Article 21.
The unjustifiably lengthy legal process and denial of
property rights to the community created living condi-
tions that caused unreasonable suffering and the loss of
life. For these conditions, the IACtHR found that Para-
guay violated Article 4(1) in relation to Articles 1(1) and
19 of the Convention. Because Paraguay did not provide
means for community members to obtain birth registra-
tion or identity documents, the IACtHR found the state
guilty of violating Article 3 vis-à-vis Article 1(1) of the
Convention. The IACtHR did not rule on Article 5
because of its decision on Article 4(1), arguing that for-
mer be covered by the decision on the Prohibition of
Arbitrary Depravation of Life.
3.3 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay 2010
The Xákmok Kásek community began its land claim in
1986 and it remains unresolved at the time of writing
this article. The Estancia Salazar cattle ranch enclosed
the Xákmok Kásek lands in the early 1900s where com-
munity members lived and laboured until their displace-
ment. Using Law 904/81 as the legal pretext, the com-
munity began its land claim by petitioning INDI for 200
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hectares of land and in 1986 INDI recognised the com-
munity’s legal status.
Akin to the Sawhoyamaxa and Yakye Axa cases, the
Xákmok Kásek land claim proceeded slowly. In Decem-
ber 1990, the community requested that IBR return
6,900 hectares of land from the cattle ranch Estancia
Salazar. IBR twice requested that the landowner prepare
to transfer the land to the community arguing that Xák-
mok Kásek was legally entitled to the land and that the
owners of Estancia Salazar were violating Law 904/81.
The Estancia Salazar landowners refuse to sell the land,
arguing that it is rationally exploited.
By late 1992, IBR determined that returning land to
Xákmok Kásek be vital due to the living conditions on
the ranch. Few community members had gainful
employment as ranch staff, and those that were
employed were routinely paid much less than their non-
Indigenous counterparts. Moreover, education and
medical services were insufficient. At that time, Estancia
Salazar spanned over 100,000 hectares of land, and the
landowners offered to sell to the community a different
parcel of land in 1992. Community members initially
accepted the offer, but upon visiting the property before
finalising the deal they rescinded the offer because the
land was inadequate for agriculture and too far from the
community’s territory. Pursuant to the 1992 National
Constitution, the community changed its claim to
encompass 20,000 hectares of land—an amount that
legally corresponded to the size and composition of the
community and ecological conditions in the Chaco.
The community’s legal counsel requested an injunction
from the Fourth Circuit Civil and Commercial Lower
Court due to evidence that the landowner intended to
sell the disputed land to a third party in late 1993. By
June 1994, IBR transferred the case to INDI for arbitra-
tion because the community had exhausted all other
administrative options to resolve the land claim. In late
1995 INDI contacted the landowner to request an offi-
cial offer to sell the claimed land. The owners of Estan-
cia Salazar refused to sell the land because they argued
that doing so would undermine the economic viability of
their ranching company and suggested that they not be
compelled to sell the land because it was rationally
exploited.
Years passed with no concrete action on the case during
which time the community remained on the ranch and
without its own lands. Yet, in June 1999 the community
petitioned the National Congress to expropriate the dis-
puted lands from Estancia Salazar. An expropriation bill
in favour of Xákmok Kásek, and sponsored by one Sen-
ator, was later rejected based on the logic of rational
exploitation that was used previously used against Yakye
Axa and Sawhoyamaxa .
After the failed expropriation attempt, community
members and their legal counsel decide to petition the
IACHR in May 2001. The IACHR admitted the peti-
tion in February 2003. The Paraguayan state refuted the
admissibility of the case and argued that Xákmok Kásek
had not exhausted all domestic remedies. The IACHR
rejected the state’s argument, however, and found that
state officials had not adequately adjudicated the land
claim nor provided a viable solution to the claim in a
timely or reasonable manner. Citing Article 42(6)(1) of
the Convention, the IACHR exempted Xákmok Kásek
from the requirement of exhausting all domestic rem-
edies because of the undue delays caused by the state.
Despite the ongoing land claim and arbitration by the
IACHR, Paraguay issued Decree 11,804 in 2008, which
declared Estancia Salazar a national protected area for 5
years. The designation limited land use and allowed
state officials to evict anyone occupying or using the
protected land. Consequently, the Xákmok Kásek com-
munity was forced to leave Estancia Salazar and moved
approximately 60 kilometres to a 1,500-hectare parcel of
land another Indigenous community offered as a tempo-
rary remedy.
In July 2008, the IACHR found the Paraguayan state
had endangered the community through its actions and
inability to protect them from harm.58 In relation to
Articles 1(1)—Obligation of non-discrimination and 2
—Domestic legal effects, the IACHR argued that Para-
guay violated the following Articles of the Convention:
3—Right to legal status; 4—Right to life; 8(1)—Right to
a hearing within reasonable time by a competent and
independent tribunal; 19—Rights of the child; 21—
Right to property; 25—Right to judicial protection.
Subsequently the IACHR issued recommendations that
included securing the Xákmok Kásek land claim and
transferring title to the community; ensuring the com-
munity’s well-being until the land claim is resolved; cre-
ate a method to allow Indigenous communities to more
effectively acquire ancestral land pursuant to domestic
law; issue identity documents; create a program to care
for children; and make pecuniary reparations for imma-
terial damages.
Not unlike the Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases that
preceded that of Xákmok Kásek, Paraguay did not ade-
quately comply with the IACHR recommendations.
The case was therefore submitted to the IACtHR in
July 2009. The IACtHR issued its judgment in August
2010 and found that the Paraguayan state violated Arti-
cles 8(1), 21(1), 25(1) vis-à-vis Articles 1(1) and 2 of the
Convention. The deprivation of land for the community
without any form of appropriate remedy was the princi-
pal factor in each of these violations. The IACtHR
argued that the state’s inability to resolve the land claim
threatened the community’s cultural identity and was
responsible for the suffering that community members
endured throughout the years of the legal process.
Additionally, the IACtHR found Paraguay guilty of vio-
lating Article 4(1) because its actions denied the com-
munity decent living conditions, particularly consider-
ing the hardships experienced living on Estancia Salazar
and the trauma of forcing the community to occupy
another parcel of land far from their ancestral territory.
The IACtHR also determined that the state was culpa-
ble for the deaths of 13 people because its actions direct-
58. Organization of American States, Report N. 11/03 Admissibility Petition
0326/01, 20 February 2003.
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ly marginalised the community. Article 1(1) was viola-
ted because many individuals did not possess state-
issued birth or death certificates due to a lack of access
to those services, which also limited the IACtHR’s abili-
ty to ascertain how many people died throughout this
process. The Right to Physical, Mental and Moral
Integrity—Article 5(1)—was violated due to land dis-
placement, deaths, and poor living conditions the com-
munity endured as a result of the Paraguayan state’s
actions, or lack thereof, throughout the land claim.
Arguing that children have special rights and are espe-
cially vulnerable populations, the IACtHR found that
Paraguay violated Article 19. Finally, the IACtHR did
not find that Paraguay had violated Article 3 of the Con-
vention because the community did not provide ade-
quate evidence to support this claim.
4 A Legal Geography
Perspective on Adjudication
of the Enxet-Sur and
Sanapana Cases
For many legal geographers, there is the sense that law
is everywhere in space and space is everywhere in law.59
Investigating the relationships between law and space
draws attention to the practices that link courtroom
adjudication with implementation politics in specific
sites.60 Distinct legal geographies created the conditions
whereby Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek
were able to petition the Inter-American System for
arbitration—living on the margin of a highway as a
result of the Paraguayan state’s inability to resolve the
cases, for example. The IACtHR judgments also shape
the creation of new legal geographies.
Legal geography is concerned with the relationships
between law and space.61 Rather than a ‘field’ of study,
legal geography is an interdisciplinary endeavour where
geographers and legal scholars work to understand the
iterative relations between space and law. Legal geogra-
phy provides a critical analytical toolkit to understand
not only how law shapes society, but also the explicitly
spatial ramifications of the law.62 Some have referred to
this as the ‘spatial turn’ in critical legal studies.63 For
example, Law 904/81, which Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa
and Xákmok Kásek used to make their land claims, pos-
its particular conceptions of socio-spatial relations: links
between ancestral territory and community identity that
are distinct from private property and the ‘rational
59. I. Stramignoni, ‘Francesco’s Devilish Venus: Notations on the Matter of
Legal Space’, 41(1) California Western Law Review 147 (2004).
60. See, e.g. D. Delaney, The Spatial and Legal Pragmatics of World-Mak-
ing: Nomospheric Investigations (2010).
61. For comprehensive reviews of legal geography scholarship see, N.
Blomley, D. Delaney & R.T. Ford, The Legal Geographies Reader: Law,
Power, and Space (2001); Braverman et al. (2014), above n. 25, at 4.
62. Ibid.
63. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulous (2011), above n. 26, at 4.
exploitation’ of land. Moreover, Indigenous relations
with space—e.g. spiritual or historical relations with
specific territories versus a solely utilitarian focus on
productive land—influenced the design of Law 904/81
and the rights it guarantees for Indigenous peoples.
The Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek
cases centre on land restitution and land rights. Each
case was predicated on particular interpretations of
three legal and geographic concepts—territory, land and
private property—that intersect throughout the adjudi-
cation process and its aftereffects. Legal geography
largely overlooks questions about territory64 in favour of
questions about property,65 the effects of the law on spa-
tial organisation and society,66 and access to public and
private space and resources. Moreover, legal scholars
most frequently consider the IACtHR Indigenous land
rights cases vis-à-vis their implications on communal
property rights due to the law’s emphasis on property as
the privileged unit of governance over territory.67 As
shown in my case sketches above, the Yakye Axa,
Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek cases are struck
through with different notions of land, territory and
property. In the following sections, I show how each
concept implicates different socio-spatial relations that
ultimately impact aftereffects of adjudication.
4.1 Land, Property or Territory?
The IACtHR judgments on the Yakye Axa, Sawhoya-
maxa and Xákmok Kásek cases evoke land in many
ways. According to my analysis of the judgments,68 land
is most frequently discussed in two distinct ways: (1)
regarding economic utility; (2) concerning Indigenous
identity. The cost of the land, its productive capacity
and the ramifications of returning it to the claimant
communities were of central concern to all parties
involved. Indeed, my presentation of the cases above
showed that the ‘rational use’ of the disputed lands was
a central element of arguments against expropriation in
each case.
Why was this the case? Paraguayan Law 854/63 states
that the only land eligible for expropriation is that which
is not under ‘rational exploitation’. Article 158 of Law
854/63 defines rational exploitation:
64. See, e.g. A. Brighenti, ‘On Territory as Relationship and Law as Territo-
ry’, 21(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 65 (2006); S. Ojalammi
and N. Blomley, ‘Dancing with Wolves: Making Legal Territory in a
More-Than-Human World’, 62 Geoforum 51 (2015).
65. N. Blomley, ‘Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Fron-
tier, the Survey, and the Grid’, 93(1) Annals of the American Associa-
tion of Geographers 121 (2003); N. Blomley, ‘Making Private Property:
Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges’, 18 Rural History 1
(2007); N. Blomley, ‘Performing Property: Making the World’, 36(1)
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 23-48 (2013).
66. Bennett and Layard (2015), above n. 14, at 2; D. Delaney, ‘Legal Geog-
raphy I: Constitutivities, Complexities, and Contingencies’, Progress in
Human Geography (2014).
67. On property and territory, see also, N. Blomley, ‘The Territory of Prop-
erty’, 40(5) Progress in Human Geography (2015).
68. I used NVivo Qualitative Data Analysis software analyse the three Para-
guayan IACtHR judgments discussed in this paper, focusing on the use
and occurrence of the concepts territory, land, and property.
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It is considered that a property completes the socio-
economic function of rational exploitation when it is
part of an establishment that is undeniably used for
agriculture, grazing, forestry, industrial or mixed-
use, and where the permanent improvements repre-
sent at least the total value of the land.
In each case, private landowners and state officials uti-
lised the logic of ‘rational exploitation’ to justify its
resistance to expropriating land for the claimant com-
munities. Instead, state officials consistently suggested
the communities should choose other parcels of land
within a broadly defined ‘ancestral’ territory. As shown
above, the IACtHR found that the state’s arguments in
favour of private property rights for ranchers under-
mine Indigenous property rights protected by Article 64
of the National Constitution and Article 21 of the Con-
vention.
Territory has become the basis of political claims and
ongoing struggles by Indigenous peoples across Latin
America since the adoption of legal frameworks defining
Indigenous territorial rights,69 with significant legal
frameworks predicated on guaranteeing Indigenous peo-
ples’ rights to ancestral territories that precede the terri-
torial form of states.70 Territory is evoked in the ILO
Convention 169, United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and Inter-
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples.71
What is the difference between ‘ancestral territory’ writ
large and specific sites within an extensive ancestral ter-
ritory? Anthropological studies suggest Enxet-Sur and
Sanapana peoples historically occupied a territory span-
ning 500,000 square-hectares.72 The Paraguayan state’s
legal counsel used this information to suggest that each
claimant community should be content to accept any
lands within that broader territory. The state’s argument
negated the historical, social and cultural values of spe-
cific sites that pertain to the families that comprise the
three claimant communities. Although Enxet-Sur peo-
ples historically occupied a large territory, all sites with-
in that territory are not of equal significance to all
Enxet-Sur peoples.
The state’s arguments exhibited broad generalisations
that Enxet-Sur peoples should be willing to accept any
parcel of land regardless of the land’s significance to the
particular community. The three claimant communities
refuted this very logic—they were not willing to accept
any parcel of land within a broader ancestral territory
because not all sites bear the same significance. The
names Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek,
for example, correspond to specific geographic sites on
69. See, e.g. ILO Convention 169, the Paraguayan National Constitution;
Gilbert (2016), above n. 1, at 1; S.J. Anaya, International human rights
and Indigenous peoples (2009).
70. Gilbert (2016), above n. 1, at 1.
71. On the role of territory and cultural ecology in international Indigenous
rights law, see J. Bryan, ‘Where Would We Be without Them? Knowl-
edge, Space and Power in Indigenous Politics’, 41 Futures 24 (2009).
72. Leake, above n. 39, at 7; Villagra-Carrón, above n. 39, at 7.
the lands each community claimed. The IACtHR judg-
ment on the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay 2010 case illustrates my point and makes an
important distinction between communal and ancestral
territory:
[W]hile the Xákmok Kásek Community refers to its
ancestral communal territory and claims it specifically,
the State refers to the ancestral territory of the Enxet-
Lengua73 as a whole and, on that basis, affirms that it
can grant an alternate piece of land within this exten-
sive ethnic territory.74
In other words, Paraguayan officials employed a notion
of territory as a homogeneous space of equal import to
the claimant communities, while the communities rejec-
ted that notion arguing for specific sites within those
territories due to their importance for communal identi-
ty.
Legal interpretations of Indigenous rights hinge on the
notion that a ‘special relationship’ exists between Indig-
enous identity and territory.75 The language employed
in the American Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples is informative. Article 15 draws a direct
relationship between Indigenous peoples and their terri-
tories: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual, cultural and
material relationship to their lands, territories and
resources to assume their responsibilities to preserve
them for themselves and future generations.’76 The ILO
Convention 169 and UNDRIP also espouse notions of a
distinctive, or ‘special relationship’, between Indigenous
culture and territory. As Stavenhagen suggested,
…[f]rom time immemorial Indigenous peoples have
maintained a special relationship with the land, their
source of livelihood and sustenance and the basis of
their very existence as identifiable territorial com-
munities. The right to own, occupy, and use land col-
lectively is inherent to the self-conception of Indige-
nous peoples.77
The ‘special relationship’ to land and territory became a
powerful tool that Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xák-
mok Kásek, respectively, employed to make their
claims, as the following excerpts from the Sawhoyamaxa
and Yakye Axa cases show. In response to IACtHR
questions about why Sawhoyamaxa turned down offers
for land other than what the community claimed, one
73. ‘Lengua’ is no longer used to refer to Enxet-Sur people.
74. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Xákmok Kásek
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) 24 August 2010, at 22.
75. R. Stavenhagen, ‘Making the Declaration Work’, in C. Charters and R.
Stavenhagen (eds.), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 352 (2009).
76. American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at 11,
emphasis mine. The 1997 Draft American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples included language that directly evoked the ‘special
relationship’, at Preamble Point Three.
77. Stavenhagen (2009), above n. 75, at 17.
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leader of the community—Carlos Marecos-Aponte—
stated:
…the members of the Community felt fully identi-
fied with the Sawhoyamaxa lands and they could not
barter ‘just like that’ the lands where their parents
and grandparents had lived. … the lands claimed by
the members of the Community were used by their
ancestors to hunt. They are the best ones; the only
place where there are still rainforests [sic]78 and other
essential conditions for their survival, such as water.
The lands claimed are of great significance for the
members of the Community because they used to
belong to them, and they still show traces of their
grandparents. What is more, many of their ancestors
are buried there.78
Tómas Galeano made a different, but equally important
argument in his testimony before the IACtHR in the
Yakye Axa case:
For the Community, ‘Yakye Axa’ means the place
where their ancestors lived and moved about. It is the
land that belongs to them, that is, the place that is
adapted to their reality as Indigenous community
members. If they live in their territory, they will feel
no fear, because they will be completely free; that is
why they request the land and the territory, for the
sake of tranquillity.79
Claimant community members articulated their claims
by using spatial mnemonics—speech acts and evidence
that tie to memories and social relationships with specif-
ic places, territories and the cultural identity of each
community. Carlos and Tómas each evoke socio-spatial
relations with specific areas that embody more than eco-
nomic relations or views of land as merely a productive
resource. That is not to say that the three claimant com-
munities are not concerned with the productive qualities
of the lands they claim. Each community seeks land
where members can maintain historical relations while
also charting a new future based on the community’s
particular interests.80 Nevertheless, the excerpts from
Carlos and Tómas, in addition to my sketch of the cases
above, underscore tensions between legal conceptions of
territory, land and property that influenced the adjudi-
cation of these cases and their aftereffects in Paraguay.
78. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) 29 March 2006, at 9.
79. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Yakye Axa Indige-
nous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and
Costs) 17 June 2005, at 16.
80. Correia (2017), above n. 11, at 2.




The IACtHR judgments bolster the de jure rights of the
Enxet-Sur and Sanapana claimant communities in Para-
guay and contribute jurisprudence to support Indige-
nous rights globally. Problems implementing the
IACtHR judgments hamper the advances made by suc-
cessful adjudication, however. What follows is a brief
discussion of some aftereffects of adjudication that are
intended to illustrate the uneven outcomes of strategic
litigation. My comments are not intended to diminish
the efforts of Tierraviva, the claimant communities or
the Inter-American System, but to shed light on how
Paraguayan state actions have exacerbated marginalisa-
tion in Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek by
negating the communities an effective or timely imple-
mentation of the IACtHR judgments.
Implementation problems are underscored by the pas-
sage of time and lack of resolution in each case. Yakye
Axa, for example, ‘won’ its case before the IACtHR in
2005 with a favourable ruling that recommended the
Paraguayan state return lands that comprise the Loma
Verde ranch for the community. Despite years of nego-
tiations, the owners of Loma Verde resisted selling the
land, and state officials did not pursue the option of
expropriating the land on behalf of the community.
Nevertheless, the Yakye Axa community maintained the
claim for its communal territory until 2012. Seven years
after the initial IACtHR ruling, community members
had grown weary of living on the margin of the highway
and agreed to accept an ‘alternative’ parcel of land to
resolve the pending land claim. State officials promptly
purchased the land, yet in the interceding years have
failed to construct an access road so the community can
move to, and utilise, the land. The alternative lands pur-
chased for Yakye Axa are located some 60 kilometres
from the community and surrounded by privately held
cattle ranches with no public access road. The Para-
guayan state has technically complied with a vital com-
ponent of the IACtHR judgment by purchasing land for
the community but has done little to change the material
conditions that the community confronts in everyday
life on the margin of the highway.
The situation creates a ‘liminal legal geography’81
whereby the community is the legal owner of property
per Paraguayan law and the IACtHR judgment but can-
not benefit from those rights because there is no way to
access or use the land. Road construction began in June
2016, but the 34-km access road is yet to be completed.
Meanwhile, the community continues to occupy a space
on the margin of the highway created in part by the fail-
ure of the Paraguayan state to uphold the rights of the
81. See Correia (2017), above n. 11, at 2.
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community and in part by the very legal situation that
allows communities to choose specific parcels of land
that pertain to them without creating a complementary
mechanism to effectively acquire those lands from prop-
erty owners who resist selling the land. In numerous
interviews and conversations with Yakye Axa communi-
ty members, the affected community members reported
that the lack of state action to resolve their land claim
maintains their social, economic and political marginali-
sation. Community members often described the situa-
tion as emotionally and psychologically painful due to
the harsh living conditions and uncertainty about the
fate of their land and livelihoods.82
Like Yakye Axa, the Sawhoyamaxa community was also
forced to occupy the margin of a highway for over 20
years of their land claim. The community was dispos-
sessed of land by local cattle ranchers shortly after ini-
tiating their formal claim in 1991 for ranching lands that
had enclosed their communal territory. The case is dis-
tinct because Sawhoyamaxa decided to reoccupy their
communal territory because the Paraguayan state sys-
temically delayed implementing the IACtHR judgment
and its recommendations for land restitution. In 2013, 7
years following the IACtHR judgment, community
members from Sawhoyamaxa reoccupied their commu-
nal territory and embarked on an intensive advocacy
campaign with the assistance of Tierraviva and Amnesty
International. To the surprise of the community and
Tierraviva, the Paraguayan Senate approved a Law 5124
in 2014 to expropriate 14,404 hectares of land to the
community.
The law of expropriation, like the IACtHR judgment,
was a remarkable legal victory that bolstered the com-
munity’s claim to its communal territory.83 Despite the
momentous victory, state officials refused to force the
landowners to accept payment for the 14,404 hectares,
surrender the title to the property, or vacate ranch
buildings contained therein. Moreover, the Paraguayan
Supreme Court entertained two challenges made by the
landowner to question the constitutionality of Law 5124
because he argued the land was ‘rationally exploited’
and therefore ineligible for expropriation. The abnor-
mality of the legal proceeding was underscored by the
censure of one of Sawhoyamaxa’s lawyers who criticised
the Supreme Court for violating juridical protections
against ‘double jeopardy’.84 Adjudication before the
IACtHR and advocacy to pass Law 5124 were success-
ful, but their aftereffects created a legal geography
whereby Sawhoyamaxa enjoys de facto usage of their
land but limited de jure protection because the property
technically remains under the legal control of the ranch-
ing company that refuses to cede the title.
The Xákmok Kásek case is distinct from Yakye Axa and
Sawhoyamaxa in several ways. The community was sit-
uated within a cattle ranch for most of the years that it




In 2010, the IACtHR issued its judgment in favour of
Xákmok Kásek and recommended that the Paraguayan
state acquire the specific parcel of land that corresponds
to the claimed communal territory. The ranch owners
refused to sell the 10,701 hectares to the community,
citing the fact that many other parcels of land within the
Sanapana ancestral territory were available for purchase.
Xákmok Kásek refused to accept alternative lands, part-
ly due to what transpired in the Yakye Axa case but
mostly because of the importance of the communal ter-
ritory to the community’s identity. Influenced by the
successful reoccupation and subsequent law of expropri-
ation for Sawhoyamaxa, Xákmok Kásek community
members reoccupied their communal territory in early
2015 to spur the land restitution, be it by expropriation
or by the wilful sale of the land by the owner.
I accompanied Xákmok Kásek in their reoccupation
efforts for many months in 2015. Throughout that time,
the community members were in regular negotiations
with state officials and the ranch owners in attempts to
broker an amenable solution. It was not until early 2017,
however, that the owners, state officials, and community
members agreed to sell the 7,701 hectares of the Xák-
mok Kásek communal territory. The community is now
the legal owner of that land (though title has not been
issued to the community yet) and in the process of
negotiating the purchase of the remaining 3,000 hectares
of land from an influential cattle ranching and dairy
consortium that resists selling. Regarding land restitu-
tion, the case has been successfully adjudicated, but like
all three cases, only to a degree.
6 Conclusion
As I suggested in the introduction, the aftereffects of
adjudication and translation of that process to practices
that support Indigenous land rights and livelihoods are
uneven and have been problematic due to the Paraguay-
an state. Implementing the IACtHR’s recommendations
is far from being a technical problem85 of getting the
policy ‘right’,86 surveying, or mapping land,87 or a sim-
ple question of political will.88 The Paraguayan state has
the technical capacity and professional expertise to
demarcate the land, execute the recommended repara-
tions, and a relatively favourable policy framework in
place to support such efforts. While Paraguay has a rela-
tively robust Indigenous rights legal framework on
paper, adjudication and implementation politics show
that the state lacks the will to guarantee those rights in a
timely or effective manner.89 Ultimately then, the state’s
85. My point also draws from conversations with Dr. Joe Bryan from Uni-
versity of Colorado Boulder Geography.
86. A. Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights’, 44(3) Cornell International
Law Journal 494 (2011).
87. See also, J. Bryan, ‘Walking the Line: Participatory Mapping, Indigenous
Rights, and Neoliberalism’, 42 Geoforum 40 (2011).
88. Stavenhagen (2009), above n. 12, at 2.
89. Tauli-Corpuz (2015), above n. 38, at 6; Stavenhagen, above n. 12, at 2.
55
Joel E. Correia doi: 10.5553/ELR.000102 - ELR April 2018 | No. 1
delayed actions in each of these cases has exacerbated
Enxet-Sur and Sanapana marginalisation and threaten
the ability of the IACtHR judgments to change the
material conditions of life that sustain human rights vio-
lations in these communities.
Adjudication does not end in the courtroom but opens a
new series of legal struggles that shape society, space
and law. The cases that I have discussed in this article
suggest that the aftereffects of adjudication create new
legal geographies that hold new possibilities but have
uncertain outcomes. Embedded within broader process-
es that drive structural violence against Indigenous peo-
ples, the three Paraguayan cases have undeniably benefi-
ted each claimant community while also creating new
challenges. One of those challenges is rooted in rectify-
ing differences in how land and territory are conceived,
valued and articulated through the adjudication process
but also through material practices by different actors in
situ. Land and territory, though distinct, are situated
within the broader politico-juridical structures of the
geopolitical state system. Within these structures,
authority and political economy often operate through
property in land. The legal ownership of land is legiti-
mised and sanctioned by the state and politico-legal
authorities90 that ‘regulate relations among people by
distributing powers to control valued resources’.91
The aftereffects of adjudication in the trio of Paraguay-
an IACtHR cases thus illuminate two fundamental
dynamics. First, the slow and uneven process by which
the Paraguayan state implements the IACtHR recom-
mendations undermines the efficacy of the judgments
and their ability to change the conditions that create
human rights violations. Second, the implementation
process reveals a discord in how territory is conceived,
enacted and valued by different actors involved in that
process. These are critical empirical issues within Para-
guay and Latin America that speak to the broader theo-
retical debates about the territorial turn,92 the perform-
ance of law93 and production of liminal legal geogra-
phies.94 Legal geography provides a way of analysing the
issues raised in this article by highlighting how law and
space are iteratively related. We see this in how rights
based on specific juridical notions of socio-spatial rela-
tions, such as a ‘special relationship’ or ‘rational exploi-
tation’, shape the limits and possibilities that Indigenous
claimants can make within the modern state system, but
also reflect how normative Indigenous orders also
inform the law. This article contributes to burgeoning
debates between legal scholars and critical human geog-
raphers concerned with the promise and peril of the
90. T. Sikor and C. Lund, ‘Access and Property: A Question of Power and
Authority’, 40(1) Development and Change 1 (2009).
91. J.W. Singer, ‘Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement’, in
C. Geisler and G. Daneker (eds.), Property and Values: Alternatives to
Public and Private Ownership (2000), at 3.
92. K. Offen, ‘The Territorial Turn: Making of Black Territories in Pacific
Colombia’, 2(1) Journal of Latin American Geography 43 (2003).
93. Blomley (2013), above n. 65, at 15.
94. See I. Braverman, ‘Rights of Passage: On Doors, Technology, and the
Fourth Amendment’, 12(3) Law, Culture and the Humanities (2016), at
669; Correia (2017), above n. 11, at 2.
international law to support de facto Indigenous rights
that lead to greater socio-environmental justice.
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